Mumbai's trysts with Terror

In many ways, March 12, 1993, and July 11, 2006, are seared in Mumbai’s consciousness. Black Friday was when Bombay got its first real taste of terrorism. Thirteen blasts shook the city, killing 257 people. It was the deadliest terrorist attack anywhere in the world then.Terrible Tuesday two years ago was when Mumbai relived the nightmare of 1993. For a second time, the city went through the trauma of serial blasts, this time on suburban trains. The toll was 187.On the surface the two attacks were similar, well-planned carnages backed by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). But there were some fundamental differences too.After the blasts of 1993, Bombay recovered its poise quickly, living up to its reputation of being able to take every adversity in its stride. But by the time 11/7 came around, the city had grown weary of living on the edge, more so after the 26/7 deluge.From the policing point of view, too, there were marked differences. For all their sophistication and planning, the 1993 blasts were essentially an act of revenge for the riots that preceded them. Though the main conspirators are still at large, the plot was quickly unravelled and most of the lower-level operatives who helped to carry it out were arrested.“The 1993 blasts signalled a marriage of the underworld and proponents of terror based abroad,” says joint commissioner of police (crime) Rakesh Maria, who led the team that investigated the case. “For the first time local gangsters were manipulated to perform anti-national tasks.”The 2006 attacks were a more complex case of jihadi terrorism. “The 11/7 attacks can’t be viewed in isolation as something divorced from the Islamic terror web, which is fed by a larger radical political Islamist movement,” says Parambir Singh, a senior officer with the Anti-Terrorist Squad.Thus, while investigators in 2006 were quickly able to see the patterns linking the attacks to the global movement for jihad, they have been unable to pinpoint the perpetrators. The suspected mastermind, Lashkar-e-Tayiba’s Azam Cheema, is a trained radical Islamist who was indoctrinated early in life. All 11 Pakistani bombers who entered the country for the blasts were on the ISI’s payroll.But beyond these basic facts, and that the attacks were funded by money from Saudi Arabia, investigators know little. For instance, they have been unable to link the suspects’ faces with elements of the crime, one reason why the charge sheet is full of loopholes. Apart from Cheema, it does not mention any other LeT chief.The charge sheet says the interrogation of Naved Hussain Khan — a key operative arrested from Hyderabad — is incomplete but does not say why. Khan, investigators say, ferried the Pakistani bombers around the city in the run-up to the bombings.Lastly, little is still known of the intricacies of the 11/7 plot. This was an instance where three groups — the LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Simi — came together to execute a task. But the precise role of each group remains hazy.By contrast, the 1993 blasts investigation was rounded off well. The precise roles of the accused were established and they were indicted. Investigators conclusively unravelled the plot and traced its execution to Dawood Ibrahim and his gang.